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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and
EDNA PATTERSON, his
wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
MAX WILCOX and
BEN D. BROWNING,
Defendants ~and Appellants.

Case No. 9278

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

A reply to respondents' brief is in order to
dispel the erroneous and inconsistent arguments
therein set forth.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE QUIT CLAIM DEED IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVEYED OIL AND GAS TO APPELLANTS.
POINT II
THIS CASE IS AN EQUITABLE QUIET TITLE
ACTION AND BOTH FACTS AND LAW MUST BE
REVIEWED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE QUIT CLAIM DEED IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVEYED OIL AND GAS TO APPELLANTS.

Where do respondents choose to make their
stand?
In the Court's Findings of Fact, paragraph 7,
( R. 75) the Court states:
1

" . . . That from the face of said unrecorded quit claim deed itself, the use of the
term "n1ineral rights", it was intended to
include only minerals and ores that were to
be treated by mills ... "
These Findings were prepared by respondents
at the direction of the court. The deed is not ambiguous the Court so found in its Findings.
Yet, respondents in their brief ·at page '36 state:
''The Trial Court had under consideration before it an "Agreement" and "Quit
Claim Deed" which was on its face susceptible
of more than one construction ... "
and they continually refer in their brief to matters
extrinsic to the deed and rules of law applicable
to ambiguous instruments.
The inconsistency is apparent. Respondents can
not say on the one had that the intent of the parties
C)
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is manifest from the deed and on the other say that
the deed is ambiguous and the intent must be gathered from matters extrinsic to it.
Let us again examine the fund·amentals of this
case. Respondents assert that their grant of "all
mineral rights" did not include oil and gas. It was
their burden to prove that assertion. Western Development vs. Nell, 288 Pac. 2d 452 (Utah).
We are first referred to the testimony of respondent George Patterson (Tr. 13-17). Respondent
Patterson merely testifies to the fact that the parties
had some conversations and negotiations concerning uranium claims. His testimony clearly refers
only to the unpatented claims which were in fact
conveyed by the deed. Nowhere does he refer to the
minerals under the 400 acres of patented ground,
nor does he state what he intended to convey by his
deed.
Furthermore, this testimony was objected to as
violating the parol evidence rule (Tr. 14) and inasmuch as the court found the intent of the parties
from the face of the deed, it is obvious that this
evidence was not even considered by the lower court.
Respondents also argue for and rely upon the
"grazing lease". It is true that the validity of this
le·ase was admitted. However, the lease was never
offered in evidence and specifically, it was never
offered by respondents for the purpose they now
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claim for it, namely to show an interpretation on
the part of all parties not to have conveyed oil and
gas in a deed executed three and one-half years
prior. Yet, it mysteriously became part of the Findings of the Court. The Court said in substance in its
Findings that the validity of the lease was admitted
and that the defendants, two of whom are appellants
herein, thereby gave an "interpretation" to the
quit claim deed to the effect that said deed did not
include oil and gas. Had it been properly offered,
an objection to its admission should have been sustained, particularly in view of the fact that the
court did not find the deed ambiguous. Only if the
deed were ambiguous and then only if it were a
contemporaneous instrument, could this lease have
a bearing on the intent of the parties. 16 Am Jur
(Deeds) §175.
"It is a general rule of construction, well
settled by the authorities, that in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties, separate
deeds or instruments, executed at the same
time in relation to the same subject matter
between the same parties or in other words
made as parts of substantially one transaction, may be taken together and construed
as one instrument."
First of all, three and one-half years separate
the execution and delivery of the quit claim deed
from the grazing lease.
Second, appellant Browning was not even a
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party to the lease and there is no testimony whatever that he had any knowledge of its existence
before this lawsuit was commenced. Yet, the Court
found that by the lease he "interpreted" a deed as
not conveying oil and gas. This is simply an unwarranted assumption by the lower court. Furthermore,
even if the lease were properly before the Court,
it does not aid respondents. Nothing in the lease
disparages the grant contained in the deed (See
page 11 of appellants' brief for a discussion of the
terms of the lease) .
If this were an ambiguous deed (which it is
not) and the extrinsic matters relied upon by respondents properly before the court "All the evidence introduced was equivocal in its meaning, and thus appellants have
failed to prove by extrinsic evidence that the
intention of the parties was other than to
grant what is generally accepted as within the
term "minerals' ". Western Development v.
Nell (supra).
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POINT II
THIS CASE IS AN EQUITABLE QUIET TITLE
ACTION AND BOTH FACTS AND LAW MUST BE
REVIEWED.

In this equitable quiet title action both law
and facts must be reviewed and the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence determined. Reimann
v. Baum, 203 P. 2d 387 (Utah).
·
The application of that rule to this case means
that the quit claim deed must be construed by this
court, its meaning found from its terms and effect
given to each of those terms. The deed granted ''all
mineral rights" a term which includes oil and gas
and this term must be given effect. Clearly, appellant's title to the oil and gas underlying the 400
acres is good and valid and a new finding to that
effect must be entered.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents have abandoned the Findings of
the lower court. They now say the deed is susceptible of more than one construction and choose to
stand on extrinsic matters within and without the
record to sustain their burden of proving that their
grant of "all mineral rights" meant less than the
clear meaning of the term.
These extrinsic matters are vague, indefinite
and at most equivocal in meaning. Respondents did
not sustain their burden of proof.
We are not thereby suggesting that a new trial
for the purpose of adducing additional evidence
should be granted. On the contrary, where, as here,
the decree of the lower court is against the weight
of the evidence, a new finding must be made by this
court. Randall vs. Tracy-Collins Trust Company,
305 Pac. 2d 480 (Utah).
The quit claim deed conveyed "all mineral
rights", including oil and gas, to appellants subject
to respondents' ten (107o) percent royalty on metalliferous ores.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Appellants
1307 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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